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Although the reasons individuals have specific stable aesthetic preferences—for example, for
abstract art or for classical music—are often studied (e.g., Furnham and Walker, 2001), there is
a growing stream of research (e.g., Nodine et al., 1993; Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham, 2004;
Axelsson, 2007; Kozbelt and Seeley, 2007; Silvia, 2007; Myszkowski et al., 2014) that is interested in
the various abilities involved when evaluating art: Are we all equally “armed” to process aesthetic
stimuli?
Our aim in this paper is to propose a new direction for this stream of research. While a typical
approach to the study of aesthetic ability consists in measuring single facets, notably aesthetic
sensitivity (e.g., Myszkowski et al., 2014), we propose a multi-content approach. More specifically,
mirroring the “g-to-IQ” shift in intelligence measurement, we want to propose a “T-to-AQ” shift
from single-content measures of “good taste” (“T”) to comprehensive assessments of an “Aesthetic
Quotient” (AQ), which would include other facets of aesthetic ability—like artistic knowledge,
sensitivity to complexity and aesthetic empathy. Rather that questioning the existence of an AQ,
we argue its usefulness, notably in predicting creative potential and achievement.
A CENTRAL “T” CONSTRUCT
What we propose as a central construct to aesthetic ability has gone by many names—“Aesthetic
Judgment” (Meier, 1940; Graves, 1948), “Aesthetic Perception” (Meier, 1963) or “Aesthetic
Sensitivity” (Götz, 1985)—but it is commonly referred to as “T” for “Taste” (Eysenck, 1983;
Myszkowski et al., 2014), which embraces the most clearly its definition: It is the ability to respond
to aesthetic stimuli in agreement with “external standards” (Child, 1964). In other words, “T” is the
ability to judge “well”—which, practically speaking, means “consensus-like” and/or “expert-like”
(Myszkowski et al., 2014).
Although the letter “T” refers to Taste, it is important to note that “T” actually does not refer to
personal taste (or personal preferences), but rather to the concept of “good taste”—“good” referring
to relevant, appropriate or correct—as we commonly use it to describe individual characteristics.
“T” is a specific ability involved in aesthetic experience (Myszkowski et al., 2014), which is a broader
concept that refers to the entire activity relative to the processing of aesthetic stimuli (Leder et al.,
2004).
Evidence for “T”
It is interesting to note here that such a letter-sobriquet—originally proposed by Eysenck (1940)—is
a direct reference to the general factor of intelligence, g. While Eysenck’s provocative personality
probably played a role in doing such a comparison, the “T” factor was indeed the result of the
extraction—using exploratory factor analysis—of a principal component of aesthetic personal
preferences, a lot like g was the result of the extraction of a principal component of intelligence
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test scores. Individuals tend to agree on the preference for
aesthetic stimuli in most visual domains (Eysenck, 1940)—
thus, consensual preferences exist for most stimuli—and the
judges who tend to agree with average judgments are the
same individuals for a wide variety of visual domains (Eysenck,
1940, 1941a)—therefore, individuals who agree with consensual
preferences do so in a wide variety kinds of stimuli. These results
point to a factor of individual differences that is stable across
visual domains, and that corresponds to the extent to which
our judgments are in agreement with consensually established
standards.
Measuring “T”
But measuring “T” is a challenge: How do we know if
an individual responds to stimuli in accordance to “external
standards”? How can we define “external standards”? The way
that “T” has been discovered by Eysenck points to a clear way
of addressing this issue: We identify or build pairs (or triads) of
stimuli, so that one is preferred (by consensual agreement and
experts) over one (or two) deteriorated versions of it. The aim
of this first step is to build pairs or triads of designs, which each
include a design of higher “objective” aesthetic quality than the
others. These pairs or triads are then used as items: The test takers
are asked to indicate, for each pair or triad, which of the two (or
three) designs they consider of better objective quality (Meier,
1940, 1963; Graves, 1948; Götz, 1985; Myszkowski et al., 2014).
A better “T” score is attributed to individuals who are better able
to effectively recognize the stimuli that are aesthetically superior.
INTEGRATING CONNECTED
CONSTRUCTS
The Lack of a Pure “T” Measure
Among what were designed as pure “T” measures, the Design
Judgment Test (Graves, 1948) and the Visual Aesthetic Sensitivity
Test (Götz, 1985) have been, because of their psychometrical
qualities, the most heavily used (Chamorro-Premuzic and
Furnham, 2004; Furnham and Chamorro-Premuzic, 2004;
Myszkowski et al., 2014; Summerfeldt et al., 2015). However,
“T” measures are restricted by their content (Gear, 1986). More
specifically, when building these measures, researchers have built
items that are not representative of the entire visual domain, and
we could point to many signs of this lack of representativeness—
the stimuli of these tests aremostly black andwhite (or black, gray
and white) paintings (Götz, 1985). Consequently, these measures
have been severely criticized as not being representative of “T.”
Gear (1986, pp. 563–564), for example, sarcastically described
the Visual Aesthetic Sensitivity Test as “a test of the ability to
discriminate between greater and lesser degrees of ‘harmony’
in monochromatic two-dimensional figures in the same way as
the well-known German painter Götz, eight other well-known
painters and the well-known British psychologist Professor H. J.
Eysenck.”
“T” is to aesthetic ability what g is to mental ability:
Central, but difficult—if not impossible—to measure with a
single test. However, while intelligence researchers switched from
appreciated attempts to build pure “g” measures (Raven, 1941)—
which are still not measures of pure intelligence (Gignac, 2015)—
to comprehensive multifactorial IQ test batteries (e.g., Wechsler,
2008), this hasn’t been the case for aesthetic ability, which hasn’t
evolved from “T” to AQ.
Other AQ Components
While measures that were designed to measure purely “T” may
have failed in completely isolating it, it can be argued that these
few measures are not the only tools that are available to capture
aesthetic ability. The concept of aesthetic ability is multifaceted,
and the measure of aesthetic ability should thus probably not
be restricted to making aesthetic judgments of monochromatic
paintings.
There is a set of existing constructs and measures that could
be used in a comprehensive AQ assessment. We could propose
for example the sensitivity to complex stimuli—named “K” in
reference to the use of K for complexity inmathematics (Eysenck,
1941b)—which is already investigated in the field of creativity
research, through the Figure-Preference Test (Barron andWelsh,
1952), and largely used to in the study of the creative personality
(Eysenck and Furnham, 1993). We could also consider as an
AQ component art knowledge, currently measured with the
Aesthetic Fluency scale (Smith and Smith, 2006; Silvia, 2007)
or the Aesthetic Experience Questionnaire (Chatterjee et al.,
2010). Additionally, measures of aesthetic empathy (Lifton, 1961;
Madsen et al., 1993; McCrae, 2007; Silvia and Nusbaum, 2011), or
of the diversity of exploration patterns (Nodine et al., 1993) could
be useful additions to a more comprehensive study of aesthetic
ability.
Indeed, we here argue that various sources of individual
differences—sensitivity to complexity, art knowledge, aesthetic
empathy, attention, exploratory perception tendencies—
constitute elements that make individuals more armed to process
art and aesthetic stimuli, making them suitable candidates for
inclusion in potential AQ assessment. However, this list is non-
exhaustive and some of the existing measures (content, norms,
scoring) would need to be updated before inclusion in a test
battery. In Figure 1, we summarize our AQ approach. Because
of their extensiveness in the visual domain, we propose example
measures for each of the facets in this domain. We however
think that similar measures should be found in other domains:
For example, a pitch recognition test could be considered as
measure of aesthetic balance recognition in the musical domain.
Associated with the list of components that we propose, we could
tentatively define AQ as the global capacity to identify, explore,
understand, seek stimulation in and respond to the elements,
composition and meaning of art and aesthetic objects.
WHY MEASURE AESTHETIC ABILITY?
AQ is Useful
The case has been previously made (e.g., Eysenck, 1988) that
the existence of intelligence is not what is demonstrated by
the discovery of g, but that such a discovery indicates a factor
that is useful to explain and understand scores in mental
ability tests, as well as to predict a variety of outcomes, like
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FIGURE 1 | Model for an Aesthetic Quotient approach of “T.”
academic achievement. Making an analogous point for AQ,
we acknowledge that the idea that aesthetic judgments can be
of better or worse quality—and that, consequently, individuals
capable of making better judgments have better taste—is a
fascinating philosophical question, but we are not here positing
that good taste exists: We are arguing, as it was suggested about
“T” (Myszkowski et al., in press), that AQ is useful as a scientific
concept, notably in the prediction and explanation of creativity.
While AQ concerns the “reception end” of aesthetic stimuli,
it may be useful in the prediction of the “production end”:
Creativity. Indeed, results suggest that the AQ components that
we discussed earlier are helpful to predict a variety of outcomes
that are creativity related. First, let us note that recent research
has indicated that the Visual Aesthetic Sensitivity Test is a
significant predictor of creative potential (Myszkowski et al.,
2014). This suggests that individuals who are better equipped
to judge aesthetic stimuli can probably use these tools to
create. Additionally, the Visual Aesthetic Sensitivity Test and
the Design Judgment Test were found to be related to creative
personality traits like openness to aesthetics (Myszkowski et al.,
2014). Besides, other AQ components that we proposed are
also predictors of creativity. For example, aesthetic response
intensity was found to be related to creative potential (Ziv and
Keydar, 2009). Moreover, research indicates that artists have
higher art expertise and process aesthetic stimuli differently
(Kozbelt and Seeley, 2007). For example, photo professionals
process photographic information more efficiently and prefer
complex photos (Axelsson, 2007).
These results suggest that aesthetic sensitivity could be partly
related to the development of creativity. To give examples of
concrete applications, one could imagine that a designer’s ability
to create a highly ergonomic and efficient webpage design could
be predicted by aesthetic ability. One could also propose training
programs, using exploratory art perception activities, to enhance
AQ among children or adults.
CONCLUSION
We have here proposed the evolution of “T” toward a more
comprehensive “AQ” approach and assessment of aesthetic
ability. First, we have discussed the concept of “T” as a
central factor of individual differences in the ability to judge
aesthetic stimuli, and explained that results show that it is
rather stable across a variety of categories of stimuli of a
specific domain. We however noted that supposedly pure “T”
measures have failed in fully encompassing aesthetic ability.
We later proposed an evolution in the study of aesthetic
ability, from attempting to purely measure “T” to a more
comprehensive approach. We have proposed for this approach
the term Aesthetic Quotient (AQ), as a reference to the “g-
to-IQ” shift to comprehensive assessments of intelligence (e.g.,
Wechsler, 2008). We finally explained that psychology and
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empirical aesthetics researchers should probably stay clear of
philosophical debates on the existence of aesthetic ability, and
rather focus on the accumulating evidence on the usefulness
of AQ components as predictors of creative potential and
achievement.
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